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Abstract 
The increasing body of knowledge in fields like animal ethology, biology, and technology has not 
necessarily led to the improvement of animal welfare. On the contrary, it has enabled humans to 
exploit animals more functionally and on increasing scales of magnitude. Building on approaches 
that stem from posthumanism and critical animal studies, we argue that instead of aiming for 
more general production of scientific knowledge, what is needed to counter exploitation and 
oppression is an increased sensitivity towards animals that arises from local, partial, and ‘situated 
knowledges’. In the first part of this paper we articulate an argument that proposes how such 
knowledges can arise from the practice of game design as a form of ‘doing multispecies 
philosophy’. The second part of this work expands this notion with an understanding of design as 
a practice of configuring and prefiguring situations in which we can enter in a relationship of 
response and attention with other ‘selves’, in other words, with entities that are alive. To explore 
the practical consequences of this framework, in the third part of this paper we discuss a game 
design project that involves some unexpected designerly negotiations with a colony of black ants. 
We conclude that our wider perspective concerning notions of knowledge, (game) design, and 
selves could elicit changes in our empathy towards other beings and help us develop new ideas 
and knowledges that favour less anthropocentric futures.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The academic fields of game studies, ethology, and anthropology have argued - in several 
occasions and contexts - that playfulness is not an attitude or a way of being that is exclusive to 
human beings (Huizinga 1955 (1950); Bateson 1987 (1972); Burghardt 2006). The awareness of 
this encompassing quality of playfulness can be easily detected in the number of artefacts (such 
as toys, games, and computer games) that are produced on the basis of the belief that beings other 
than humans are not only sentient, but can express themselves playfully. Explorations of 
academic research that involve the development of playful artefacts are also a revelatory indicator 
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of the emergence of this new sensitivity towards non-human playfulness. In the specific case of 
animals, some examples include research projects conducted with touch screen game prototypes 
for sheltered orang-utans (Wirman 2014), a videogame concept that allows humans and farmed 
pigs to play together (Driessen et al. 2014), a tablet game prototype for humans and domestic cats 
(Westerlaken & Gualeni 2014), and prototypes that explore interactive toys for captive elephants 
(French 2015). 
 
 
Our engagement with animals (as well as with non-living things) is defined by an ongoing 
transformative practice of developing ‘knowledges’1 and sensitivities – or insensitivities – that 
define the ways in which we establish and reshape our relationships with other beings such as our 
pets, the farm animals that some of us eat, or the insects that surreptitiously join our picnics. 
Following conceptual frameworks that emerged in fields like posthumanism and critical animal 
studies, with this paper we hope to contribute to the widening of our moral horizon in the field of 
design, and game design in particular, to include things like ecosystems, animals, artificial 
intelligences, and objects as stakeholders in design processes and as factors in the evaluation of 
the ethical implications of our design interventions.  
 
 
As argued in our previous work, being playful is a mode of being that can be shared among 
different species (Westerlaken & Gualeni 2013). As also already explained elsewhere, we 
understand design as a practice that allows us to materialize not only our functional plans, but 
also our ethos and our sensitivity, making them objects for (their own as well as other people’s) 
critical evaluation (Gualeni 2014b). Through design, we acquire new perspectives on who we are 
and understand and construct ourselves and our world (Gualeni 2014b). In this paper, we focus 
on the practice of designing computer games, and playful artefacts, for animals and reflect on 
how design is an activity that can be deliberately employed as a transformative process. Among 
several possible transformative uses of (computer) game design we will concentrate our attention 
to its suitability for challenging our relationships with other species and our anthropocentric 
preconceptions. With the game design experiment that we will explain and reflect upon in the 
third section of this paper, we are interested in exploring alternative scenarios in which 
speciesism 2  can be approached critically and new perspectives on the various and complex 
relationships between animals and humans can be reframed and reshaped. 
                                                      
1 The term ‘knowledges’ here is deliberately written in plural, aligning with Donna Haraway’s notion of ‘situated 
knowledges’, which will be discussed more extensively later on in this paper. 
 
2 ‘Speciesism’ is a term that is brought under attention by the field of critical animal studies and refers to the 
assignment of values and rights to individuals solely on the basis of their species membership. The term first 
appeared in a pamphlet by Richard D. Ryder in 1970 that was used to protest against animal experimentation (Singer 
2015 (1975)). Analogous with discrimination based on race (racism) or sex (sexism), speciesism has intersectional 
characteristics with other forms of oppression and follows a similar pattern in allowing the interest of one species 
(usually the human) to override the interests of other (usually non-human) species (Singer 2015 (1975)). 
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The field of digital game design has been understood and used as a tool for self-exploration and 
self-construction in a number of contexts including, among others, professional training, social 
activism, and philosophical inquiry (Gualeni 2014b). With this paper, we are not interested in 
producing academic outputs in the form of instrumental scientific constructs that aspire to 
universal validity and applicability. Instead, we are looking for new ways to talk about 
knowledges, in its plural form (Haraway 1988). When pursuing ‘knowledges’, rather than 
looking for comprehensive knowledge claims, we wish to further articulate Donna Haraway’s 
idea of ‘situated knowledges’, which are partial and critical, interpretations of possible world-
views that allow for unexpected openings and negotiations with other entities (Haraway 1988). 
Haraway’s 1988 text Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege of 
partial perspective advocates for alternatives to the dominant way of developing knowledge in 
Western societies, that is to say to the epistemological perspective which understands knowledge 
as a rational construal that, proceeding from experimental observations, aspires to be universally 
valid and applicable in every circumstance. When pursuing knowledge through the dominant, 
scientific paradigm, researchers customarily adopt detached, theoretical approaches (from a 
presumed ‘view from nowhere’) that reveal the world as consisting of objects and phenomena 
whose qualities and interactions can be understood quantitatively and employed with functional 
purposes in mind. Concerned with the exclusivity and often unquestioned claim to objectivity of 
science, Haraway proposes a different kind of episteme that values ‘local’ and contextual 
knowledges, and that arises from perspectives that are partial, flexible, and to a degree engaged 
with the very objects of their inquiry (a knowledge from somewhere, as opposed to ‘from 
nowhere’: an epistemological approach that is open to surprises and compromises). These local 
knowledges do not only come with a view from somewhere (or someone), but they also 
inevitably entail personal accountability. As Lucy Suchman wrote: “it is precisely the fact that 
our vision of the world is a vision from somewhere – that it is inextricably based in an embodied, 
and therefore partial, perspective – which makes us personally responsible for it.” (Suchman 
2002: 96).   
 
 
Partially inspired by the concept of ‘situated knowledges’, in this paper, we argue for the 
complementary value of paying attention to how local knowledges arise from design practices, 
knowledges that could elicit and accompany shifts in our current worldviews, in the development 
of our sensitivity, and in the way we care for our environment. We believe that the notion of 
‘situated knowledges’ fits particularly well with the practice of experimental and design-driven 
approaches as a way to prefigure and explore potential futures. Once again, we wish to emphasize 
that ‘situated knowledges’ arise from the processes of design itself: a practical form of producing 
knowledges and transformations, and taking responsibilities (both in the ‘users’ and in the 
designers themselves) in which designers are not usually aiming at producing universal 
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statements about their world and/or their creations, but rather configure and prefigure new 
perspectives and possibilities that could challenge or change the status quo and raise questions 
about the new worlds we can envision (Krippendorf 2005). 
 
 
In particular, in the design experience discussed in this paper, our situated knowledges arose from 
designing games for (and together with) an animal that most of us are familiar with, but do not 
necessarily relate to in a playful manner: lasius niger, the common black ant. Motivated not by 
the desire to scientifically demonstrating that play is an activity that can take place with or among 
ants, nor by a need to confirm hypotheses concerning animal behaviour, this project was 
characterised by a ‘research through design’3 approach in a quest for situated knowledges and 
sensitivities towards other beings, that could be helpful in exploring potential relationships 
between humans and ants. 
 
 
Aligning with theoretical notions from posthumanism and critical animal studies, and with the 
aim to expand the breadth of our moral circle to embrace a wider array of beings (coessential 
stakeholders of the planet we inhabit and in the interventions we design), we wanted to engage in 
a practice that could help us to negotiate and rethink our relationships with ants (or other insects). 
Rather than the more abstract task of designing for an entire ant colony or merely regarding the 
ants as a means for our own amusement, we carried out a design exercise as a deliberate, 
transformative practice for the designers: together with a group of students, we engaged in the 
practice of design to speculate on the idea of designing ‘games’ that an ant could actually decide 
– or refuse – to engage with. Over the course of six months, we carried out three phases of design 
exploration that we will elaborate on in a later section of this paper. These phases include a 
fieldwork phase that was documented through ethnographic as well as autoethnographic 
observations (I), a group exercise with 16 interaction/game designers in which five different 
prototypes were created (II), and a playtesting-plus-personal-reflection period of five weeks, 
broadcasted via Twitch and other streaming platforms in which the ants interacted with the 
designs (III).  
 
 
In part 1 of this paper we will discuss and reflect upon the design of computerized (as well as 
analog) games for non-humans as a transformative practice that can help us approach ‘the other’ 
with openness and a willingness to engage with one another in unexpected ways as a form of 
doing multispecies philosophy. In part 2 of the paper we will tackle strategies and possibilities 
(both conceptual and design-related) that might allow us to relate to ‘the other’. This passage will 
                                                      
3 With the term ’research through design’ we refer to a growing academic field that is characterized by research 
contributions in which design processes and practical inquiries inform and investigate topics that are multistable (see 
footnote 6), complex, and future oriented (Buchanan 2001; Gaver 2012; Löwgren, Larsen & Hobye 2013). 
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be conducive to an attempt at articulating what we mean with ‘design’ and whom we could 
involve in design processes. In taking this reflection into the practice of design, we will then 
discuss how the ongoing design project with ants generated new perspectives and sensitivities 
concerning our engagement with other beings.  
 
 
Part 1: Approaching the Other 
 
The more we research the complexity of animals, the more we learn about their sentience, their 
cognitive capabilities, their preferences, and their unique traits. New insights into the peculiar 
ways in which animals are in the world, their striking analogies with human behaviour and their 
unique phenomenological and ethological traits could be springboards for a deeper and better-
informed concern about the way we conceptualize, treat, and exploit animals. It could potentially 
foster long-term changes in our relationships with animals in the direction of a more embracing 
and articulated sensitivity towards them.  
 
 
In a strident contrast with these expectations, capitalistic values as well as the impact of 
technological developments on the welfare of animals appear to be stuck to an exclusive (and 
exclusively functional) anthropocentric perspective. Rather than pursuing interests that would put 
an end to animal (or human) exploitation and would minimize their suffering, Western culture 
has used its universal and scientific knowledge to develop technology and design practices that 
expedite profit and increase productivity (Hribal 2007). Rather than working towards better 
animal (or human) treatment, one could argue that technology ranging from horse shoes, barbed 
wire, restraining devices, and automatic feeders all the way to genetic manipulation, specialized 
breeding, animal tracking, and artificial insemination has only allowed for more efficient 
exploitation and control of animals. It also enabled us to operate factory farming on much larger 
scales.  
 
 
In other words, we can argue that generating scientific insights concerning animal welfare and 
animal suffering does not necessarily lead to an improvement in their life conditions. From this 
perspective, we argue that rather than aiming for more objective and granular scientific output, 
what is needed is to complement our current way of gathering information about animals with 
situated knowledges. A more engaged and context-sensitive approach, we believe, can increase 
our sensitivity and attitudes towards other entities on our planet and specifically motivate a 
reconsideration of relationships between humans and animals.  
 
 
From our perspective, the objective of expanding the horizon of our moral concern should stem 
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from a willingness to move beyond anthropocentrism and the exclusive (or quasi-exclusive) 
economic focus that characterises contemporary social practices. We also believe that positive 
forms of interspecies engagements that are not aimed at producing or facilitating production, such 
as play or playfulness, are particularly suitable contexts in which the ethical and cultural goals 
outlined in this paper could be pursued (Westerlaken & Gualeni 2013). According to Haraway, 
through shared encounters of ‘play’ and ‘touch’, we experience and discover degrees of freedom 
and possibilities to ‘become-with the other’. Here, ‘becoming with’ refers to the intuitive and 
bodily understanding that takes place between humans and animals when they encounter each 
other and recognize, respond to, and establish respectful relationships (Haraway 2008). With the 
objective of eliciting more sensitivity and empathy towards other beings on this planet, we 
propose to engage in activities that allow us to get to know other animals, and learn more about 
their specific preferences and interests. This is not to say that playfulness is the only, or the most 
preferable, way in which new situated knowledges could be generated and elicit a transformation. 
We could, with similar purposes, take part in other forms of shared interactions between humans 
and animals. For example, by designing for shared affection, shaping interventions that 
encourage humans and animals to do physical activities together, proposing critical artefacts that 
reveal unequal power dynamics between humans and animals, or even designing for negative 
experiences such as pain or distress4. These examples could all constitute shared contexts where 
we could work for and together with other beings towards situated knowledges that affect our 
relationships with them. In our work, as already mentioned, we are specifically interested in our 
relationship with animals, and in the design of playful interactions with them. By designing 
playful experiences for and with animals, we wish to try to invite the animal (within the 
constraints of the design) to willingly and freely appropriate artefacts and make decisions within 
playful settings. 
 
 
In our aim to design playful interactions that are meaningful to the animal, we are exploring 
different possibilities for overcoming some of the complexities we encounter in trying to 
understand the life-world of the animal, the so-called ‘other’. As Thomas Nagel answered to his 
question ‘What is it like to be a bat?’, there is surely something that it is like to be a bat. Just like 
humans, bats have a specific kind of selfhood, a unique way of being in the world that is largely, 
but not uniquely, determined by their perceptual and cognitive structures. According to Nagel, 
however, we can imagine and fantasize what it could be like for us to be bats, but never access 
the experience of what it is like to be a bat for a bat (Nagel 1974). Taking that perspective could 
perhaps only be possible through a deliberate and radical modification of human biology, and 
thus fundamentally altering our perceptual and cognitive systems. Without such drastic measures, 
                                                      
4 In our work, we are specifically interested in designing for positive and pleasurable experiences that could elicit a 
change in our sensitivity towards other beings. However, we need to consider that such changes could theoretically 
also be evoked (and perhaps even more effectively so) by interventions that explore experiences that are painful and 
distressing for the humans and animals involved. In this context, we recommend that the designers of such 
interventions consider with the utmost care the ethical implications and consequences of engaging in such practices.  
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Nagel argued, we cannot hope to understand or adopt an ‘alien’ selfhood.  
 
 
Where Nagel tries to approach this topic through philosophical reasoning, others have attempted 
to experiment with this question through the practice of design. In a project called Animal 
Superpowers, designers Chris Woebken and Kenichi Okada explored how animal senses are 
different from human senses by designing artefacts such as a microscopic antenna that mimics 
the vision of ants, a bird device using GPS and vibrations to approximate birds’ detection of 
geomagnetic fields, and giraffe goggles that raises the user’s visual perspective by 30cm (Animal 
Superpowers 2008) (see Figure 1).  
 
  
Figure 1: in approaching animal characteristics through design, the 2008 project Animal Superpowers 
explores the sensory perception of ant antennas that magnify the user’s vision (left) and a giraffe device that 
heightens the user’s visual perspective (right) (Animal Superpowers 2008). Images used with permission. 
 
Another attempt at getting closer to the life experiences of an animal includes the experimental 
videogame Haerfest, developed in 2009 by Technically Finished. This digital experiment aimed 
to deal directly with some of the questions that were formulated in Nagel’s essay (Gualeni 
2014a). The game enables the human player to experience a virtual world in first-person through 
an ‘alien’ sensory system. Through processes of metaphorism and synaesthesia, the perceptions 
and interactive experience of a player in the world of Haerfest should approximate those of a bat, 
including a bat’s short eyesight, its acute sense of smell, and its spatial understanding and 
navigation via echolocation (see Figure 2).  
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Figure 2: the action-adventure videogame Haerfest offers its players the possibility to explore and interact 
with a tri-dimensional world with an alien sensory system that has analogies to that of a bat. The game uses a 
first-person perspective and also features a narrative progress around the themes of identity and self-
discovery (Gualeni 2014a). 
In both of these design projects it becomes apparent that, even though technology and virtual 
worlds open up new phenomenological (and even ontological) horizons, these experiences are 
still inescapably bound to the horizon of our being in the world as humans (Gualeni 2014a). Such 
experiments, in fact, are inevitably limited to being part of a human quest for knowledges and 
understandings that are ‘human, too human’ even because they are pursued through technology 
that materialize certain human ways to conceptualize world-views5: an enterprise that does not 
specifically encourage us to critically rethink anthropocentrism or social practices that affect lives 
of other species. 
 
 
What if, instead, we deliberately tried to use technological mediation to share and disclose 
knowledges with the aim to foster transformations that encourage us to think beyond 
anthropocentrism in cultural practices? What kind of theories and design strategies can we adopt 
with the purpose to rethink and redesign relationships with ‘the other’? 
 
 
As mentioned in the introductory section, design understood as a practice for becoming sensitive 
to other beings as a starting point for making moral (design) decisions does not only arise out of 
instrumental scientific constructs from fields like animal ethology or biology, but should be 
complemented with sensitivities and knowledges that motivate a shift beyond anthropocentrism. 
                                                      
5  All technologies materialize specific declinations of rationality and of our inescapably human ways of 
understanding space, time, and causation (Gualeni 2015). For example, regardless of their absolute precision and the 
indefatigably repetitive cycles of their calculations, computers nowadays still retain the biological imprint of human 
kinds of world-views that inspired the first Turing machines. In the field of the digital humanities, Willard McCarty 
similarly focused on “the fundamental dependence of any computing system on a specific conception of the world or 
‘model’ of it” (McCarthy 2005: 21). Still using the computer as a metonymy for any kind of technologies, we would 
like to paraphrase a famous remark by Ludwig Wittgenstein and propose the idea that ‘if a lion built a computer, we 
could not use it.’ 
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This implies that engaging in encounters in which we can get to know the animal and account for 
the unique qualities that characterize different beings prompts us to pay attention to affinities and 
similarities that we can recognize in ‘the other’, while at the same time perceiving our 
differences. These types of encounters, materialized in the case of this paper in the form of 
practical [computer (game)] design interventions and reflections, could propose alternative 
futures with animals and elicit a transformation in our sensitivity and ethos towards other beings. 
 
 
An example of an approach that connects with these aims includes the Playing with Pigs project. 
As a reaction to a European law that requires all pigs to have toys in their shed as a form of 
environment enrichment to prevent boredom and tail biting, a team of researchers and designers 
started with the development of a videogame that connects humans and pigs over distance and 
allows them to interact with each other. Using the game prototype as a conversation piece, the 
Playing with Pigs project invites us to rethink and speculate about our relationships with farm 
animals through encounters that could be both scientifically interesting as well as 
intersubjectively meaningful (Driessen et al. 2014). The researchers suggest that philosophical 
inquiry and ethics do not only happen through articulated arguments and debates and designing 
can be a fruitful mode of thinking, through materializing ideas and tinkering with these on the go 
(Driessen et al. 2014). 
 
 
These type of shared engagements, framed as a form of ‘doing’ multispecies philosophy through 
design practices could be a way to foreground the experiential nature of what it means to be a 
moral person (Driessen et al. 2014). Furthermore, the situated knowledges and sensitivities that 
are generated through this practice could help us to critically rethink the roles animals have in our 
society. Over the last couple of years, several other researchers/designers have explored the topic 
of playful interaction for, and together with, animals through the practice of game design (see for 
example Wirman 2014; Westerlaken & Gualeni 2014; French, Mancini, & Sharp 2015). These 
projects could undoubtedly generate situated knowledges and sensitivities that affect the 
relationships between the animals and humans that are involved in these processes, but the 
implications or impact of the transformations that they could elicit have never been explicitly 
articulated. Furthermore, these projects all involve animals that are relatively similar or known to 
us in terms of cognitive structures or playful behaviour, such as orangutans, pigs, cats, and 
elephants. If the idea of multispecies philosophy through design is to address the problem of 
speciesism (see footnote 2), who do we invite to these practices, and when is ‘the other’ so 
remote from ourselves and our level of understanding that it becomes impossible to design or 
philosophize with or about?  
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Part 2: Designing as a Practice that Enables Selves to Respond  
 
The verb ‘to design’ can, in its widest sense, indicate the activity of configuring and prefiguring 
situations in order to propose alternative ones. A traditional, and still widely used, understanding 
of ‘design’ is the idea of “changing existing situations into preferred ones” (Simon 1969: 111). 
According to Krippendorf, this is a good start, but it is important to realize that the common role 
of designers is to propose changes rather than actually realize them; furthermore, the outlined, 
traditional definition completely ignores the historical – and more generally contextual – 
dimensions of design: in different situations – and under different systems of values – some 
design solutions can be understood as desirable for some, undesirable for others, at odds with 
societal norms and customs, or completely familiar (Krippendorf 2005). More encompassing (and 
inevitably vaguer) perspectives on design are offered by Highmore, who proposes to embrace it 
as a series of negotiations (Highmore 2009), and by Feenberg, who understands designs as 
“negotiated achievements” (Feenberg 1995: 9). Similarly, Verbeek embraces the practice of 
design as “a material form of doing ethics” (Verbeek 2008: 91), while for Keshavarez it is a 
“mode of acting, of doing and of configuring the situation in order to propose other possible 
situations” (Keshavarez 2016: 92). Famously, Dilnot understood design processually, that is to 
say a process of negotiation with the given which extends the boundaries of the previously 
possible (Dilnot 2005).  
 
 
In our aim to engage in a form of multispecies philosophy through the practice of design, a 
broader understanding of design as a complex and multistable 6  activity is helpful in further 
defining who could potentially be involved in the designerly negotiations outlined above. 
 
 
The various processes that constitute a design process can be recognized as having an impact on a 
multitude of beings, things, and situations. A seemingly simple design process could have effects 
and repercussions on a vast network of humans and non-humans that mediate, and are mediated 
by design processes in different stages of their planning and execution phases (Latour 1993; 
Verbeek 2008). In projects that aimed to configure and prefigure complex and multistable 
situations, design decisions even led to transformations of entire ecosystems (Monbiot 2014), or 
had unintended and unforeseen effects that resulted in completely unexpected ways in which 
artefacts were appropriated by their users (Verbeek 2008).  
 
                                                      
6 This term, introduced by Don Ihde in his 1990 book Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth 
indicates the quality of a technology or an activity of being non-deterministic and influenced by a variety of factors. 
Multistable artefacts and practices are, according to Ihde, always appropriated and engaged by their users in ways 
that are flexible, adaptable, and context-dependent. 
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In our aim to expand our moral horizon beyond a perspective that is largely (or even exclusively) 
anthropocentric, the wider understanding of design that we discussed in the previous paragraphs 
informs new and practical ways of thinking that could help us in overcoming human-centred 
design practices with an interrelated set of objectives: 
1) contributing to an ethical shift towards caring for other beings on our planet that we 
consider timely and necessary, 
2) developing a clearer and more complete understanding of (game) design as a 
transformative practice for both the designers and the entities that are involved in – and 
affected by – design practices, and 
3) of design and ‘making’ as ways of ‘doing’7 multispecies philosophy.  
 
 
In the field of posthumanism, scholars such as Bruno Latour, Ian Bogost, and Peter-Paul Verbeek 
articulate theoretical frameworks that include non-humans as active components that shape and 
reshape the world in different ways (Latour 1993; Verbeek 2008; Bogost 2012). Here, the term 
non-human is used in a way that indicates everything that is not human: animals, objects, 
concepts, as well as other forms of life like algae and bacteria. Generally speaking, the aim of the 
mentioned scholars can be identified as restructuring and expanding our ethical framework and 
prompting us to consider (as well as re-consider) the involvement of other entities in social 
processes that involve planning and negotiating our shared practices. Their aim is, to put it in a 
somewhat simpler manner, to break down anthropocentric hierarchies. By separating humans 
from ‘all that is other’, however, these approaches maintain a focus on the human and can still be 
recognized as evidently anthropocentric, and thus problematic in terms of establishing a more 
compromissory and vast context for design processes that aim to involve animals (Westerlaken & 
Gualeni 2016, forthcoming). 
 
 
Anthropologist Eduardo Kohn sees the traditional dichotomic division between humans and non-
humans as the biggest shortcoming of the posthumanities. He argues that bringing non-humans 
and humans into the same analytical framework is an approach that leads to the under-
appreciation of concepts like agency and representation, and leaves these topics outside of the 
central interests of disciplines within the posthumanities (Kohn 2013). He argues that these ways 
of thinking blind us to the kinds of agency that do in fact exist beyond human ontologies. In 
similar fashion, but grounded in the field of critical animal studies, Hribal also discusses our 
                                                      
7 In this context, we propose the idea of ‘doing’ as a possible, fruitful alternative to the logo-centrism that dominates 
the methodological horizon of the humanities. Constructing artefacts as a way to pursue philosophy offers, 
according to the outlined perspectives, an opportunity to correct the discursive and linguistic bias of humanistic 
culture. “According to this view, we should be open to communicating scholarship through artefacts, whether digital 
or not. It implies that print is, indeed, ill equipped [sic] to deal with entire classes of knowledge that are presumably 
germane to humanistic inquiry.” (Ramsay & Rockwell in Gold 2012: 78) 
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tendency to overlook agency and selfhood in animals, and argues that this perspective 
unproductively understands animals as static beings, or as objects devoid of any ‘real substance’. 
Hribal encourages us, instead, to recognize and appreciate their capacity for responding and 
resisting to situations and changes (Hribal 2007). With the aim of dismantling the conceptual 
dichotomy between humans and non-humans which he finds deleterious, Kohn takes a more 
encompassing and compromissory ontological stance and focuses on identifying what makes a 
process ‘alive’. He argues that capabilities such as those of making choices, responding to 
stimuli, and adapting to new situations need to be accounted for, because if we continue to ignore 
these aptitudes in other entities, we are always forced to fall back on theories that centre around 
human-like forms of representation and intentionality such as language and moral reasoning 
when we wish to reflect on engagements with ‘the other’ (Kohn 2013). 
 
 
The limiting approach to non-human agency that is often taken for granted in posthumanism 
overlooks the fact that some members of the non-human category can be understood as ‘selves’, 
where by selves we indicate – after Kohn – processes that are subject to response and adaptation, 
in other words to things that are ‘living’ (Kohn 2013: 7). The response and adaptation that qualify 
a ‘self’ according to Kohn do not need to take place at time scales and with modalities that 
customarily enter the horizon of human phenomenologies: for example, a coral reef takes 
centuries to grow, and climatic changes in an ecosystem are not always possible to be perceived 
and understood at the temporal scale of human beings. In rethinking ‘otherness’ from an angle 
that is grounded in phenomenology, philosopher Bernhard Waldenfels proposes the possibility of 
an ‘alien phenomenology’ that relies on ‘responsive ethics’. We found that Kohn and Waldenfels 
took remarkably similar strategies to approach ‘otherness’, strategies that rely on basic 
perceptions and responses as its key tools, tools that are not rooted in symbolic, metaphorical, or 
abstract forms of thinking and expressing thought. Instead, their suggested approach has an 
indexical and responsive character (Waldenfels 2011). Both in the work of Kohn as well as in 
Waldenfels’s, the very basic features that could allow us to engage with ‘the other’ are to be 
found in our fundamental similarities. It is in that basic, shared biological background that 
transformations and engagements (in the form of responses, reactions, and ‘attention’) can take 
place.   
 
 
Using this theoretical lens is particularly useful as it allows us to distinguish entities with a self 
(like a cockroach or a human) from entities without a self (for example a chair or a rock, which 
do not respond and adapt in the same way that living entities do). To be sure, these selves are not 
necessarily part of the animal kingdom, and they do not even have to be endowed with a nervous 
system to be recognized as ‘selves’: according to Kohn, plants and mushrooms also qualify. 
Additionally, he maintains that selfhood can be distributed over multiple bodies. This is the case, 
for example of the ‘selfhood’ of a seminar, a crowd, a forest, or an ant colony (Kohn 2013). 
 13 
 
 
In adopting definitions of both ‘knowledge’ and ‘design’ that are not solely focused on functional 
or universal aspects of their output, we aim to make space for less hierarchical and less 
anthropocentric forms of engagements with other entities. Starting out by arguing for the 
complementary value of generating situated knowledges through the practice of design, we can 
now come back to the question asked earlier in this paper.  
 
 
We propose to articulate the practice of ‘doing’ multispecies philosophy through design by using 
the notion of a ‘self’ outlined above, where Kohn identified a ‘self’ as an entity (individual as 
well as collective) capable of responding and adapting. Starting with this conception of what a 
‘self’ is, we might attempt to understand and design with ‘the other’ as an entity with which we 
can enter in a relationship of response and negotiation which can guide and shape the design as a 
shared activity in itself. In practice, this means that we could try to engage in a designerly 
relationships with plants, bacteria, and crowds because we could invite these entities to engage 
with – and adapt to – our design and to interact with the designers in an indexical exchange of 
responses. To be sure, these responses and adaptations do not necessarily have to be immediate or 
direct, but could also take place over longer timespans, happen over multiple generations, or 
manifest itself through the absence of response entirely. In contrast, these kind of processes could 
not be achieved in a similar way with non-living entities such as bricks, paper cups, and 
snowflakes, because these things do not actively respond to our design interventions. Arguably, 
from a metaphorical perspective, one could suggest that, non-living entities, such as the materials 
that are used in a design process, are also capable of responding to the way in which they are 
used by the designer, for example when materials break down or ‘resist’ to certain kinds of 
treatment. Donald Schön labelled this as ‘back-talk’, “a reflective conversation with the materials 
of a situation” (Schön 1987: 31). However, in this paper, we are specifically interested in 
sensitivities and transformations that arise from the practice of engaging with living entities with 
whom we can actively and dynamically negotiate in design processes. 
 
 
In the first two parts of this paper, we aimed at articulating ways that can help us expand our 
moral concern to other selves and generating situated knowledges through the practice of doing 
multispecies philosophy. To explore the practical consequences of these arguments, we initiated a 
project in which we actively tried to engage in a design process with an ant colony, as an exercise 
in designing with ‘otherness’ that is fairly remote from our everyday understanding of the world, 
but could still produce relatively recognizable and immediate responses towards the design 
interventions we present.  
 
 
 14 
 
Part 3: Design Challenges with Ants 
 
The experimental project that we will describe and account for in this section of our paper was 
motivated and guided by the following question: (how) can we actively involve ants, as selves, in 
the process of designing a playful space or a game that they can potentially appropriate?  
 
 
In this process we did not aim to demonstrate playfulness as an activity in ants, or try to produce 
generalizable knowledge claims on ant behaviour or cognitive capabilities. Instead, our goal was 
to use design practices to generate ‘situated knowledges’ that could encourage transformations 
and sensitivities among designers that could propose new ideas about our relationships with these 
ants (as well as ant colonies) as selves that are included in our moral horizon. Furthermore, this 
project allowed us to practically question and reconfigure our understanding of what constitutes 
‘players’. So instead of defining concepts like ‘play’ and ‘players’ as the a priori foundations of 
this experiment, we adopted a ‘research through design’ approach (see footnote 3) where doubts 
and emerging reflections provided the flexibility and the philosophical space to adopt new 
perspectives and sensitivities on both play and the selfhood of ants, and to respond to the actions 
and behaviours of the ant colony. 
 
 
The project spanned over a period of five months and can be divided in three different phases: a 
fieldwork phase (I) in which we took an attempt at familiarizing with the ants and the behaviours 
of this very alien ‘selfhood’, documented through ethnographic as well as autoethnographic 
methods (including pictures, conversations, and a designer journal), a design phase (II) consisting 
of a short gamejam with 16 interaction/game designers that developed different prototypes, and a 
playtesting phase (III) in which the interactions of the ants where each of the prototypes was live-
streamed and reflected upon as the ants appropriated them.  
 
 
Phase I: fieldwork, or: living with an ant colony 
 
In the first phase of this project, the first author of this paper acquired a black ant colony 
(including a queen and 15 workers) and set up a living environment for the ants at her workspace 
for a total of three months. These ant nests are available as commercial products in different sizes 
and possible configurations (see Figure 1) As expected, the introduction of an ant colony in an 
office setting was in itself a source of unexpected situations and possibilities for ‘situated 
knowledges’ to develop. The ant colony became an often discussed subject among colleagues, 
and people made a habit of visiting that particular office to see what the ants were doing. While 
spending time with the ants on a daily basis, the designer herself reported that she started caring 
 15 
about the ants at an emotional level, which caused mixed feelings of doubt about the ethical 
problems with keeping the said ants in captivity. Furthermore, during these three months, we 
tried out different living arrangements and small design interventions to see how the ants would 
respond and the designer spent time learning more about ant behaviour through getting engaged 
with existing literature, recent scientific research, and nature documentaries. 
 
 
One day, the ants managed to escape from their artificial and confined living space, which 
qualified as one of the most thought-provoking events of the whole period. Their remarkable 
escape story involved some ants that found a small opening between two walls of their Plexiglass 
living space, escaped, gathered some pieces of carton from a nearby source, and stacked these 
pieces in between the Plexiglass in order to make the opening bigger and walk in and out more 
comfortably. 
 
   
Figure 3: the confined living environment of the ants (left image) consisted of a plastered nest with different 
chambers and an outside area made of transparent Plexiglass where the ants gather resources and bring out 
garbage from their nest. The attached tubes provide sugary water. The image on the right shows the queen 
ant, some of the workers, and the (then taped off) part of the Plexiglass that the ants used to escape through. 
 
The designer then started to reflect on how this escape-story could be used as a provocative and 
speculative starting point for a design context opening that could inspire designers to develop 
escape-room challenges8 that the ants could potentially play (regardless of whether we are willing 
to accept their interaction with the prototypes as playful). At the same time, this escape-story and 
the close day-to-day relationship with the ants evoked feelings of doubts and cruelty that the 
designer documented in a journal: 
 
“Some days I feel a bit bad about having those ants in possession. […] It seemed like ants 
                                                      
8 “Escape rooms are live-action team-based games where players discover clues, solve puzzles, and accomplish tasks 
in one or more rooms in order to accomplish a specific goal (usually escaping from the room) in a limited amount of 
time.” (Nicholson 2015: 1). 
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could actually be satisfied in captivity, because they have all the resources they need and 
in the wild they apparently don’t go further away from their nest than absolutely 
necessary. But the more I think about these things, the more I feel that I’m somehow cruel 
to them, especially in relation to their escape adventure and me blocking their way out 
(after they put so much effort into building their escape route) or using this as an insight 
into making escape rooms in which we as humans are in control of their life in such an 
unequal way.” 
 
 
In spite of these doubts, the designer decided to continue the project while musing over the power 
dynamics and inequality between the humans and animals that were involved in it. At that point, 
she wanted to know whether other people would undergo similar transformations once they got 
involved in a design process that similarly aimed at engaging an ant colony as an example of an 
‘other’. 
 
 
Phase II: design, or: escape room challenges for ants 
 
With this escape story as inspiration, an Escape Room for Ants Gamejam was organised during 
the Student Interaction Design and Research (SIDeR) conference at Malmö University (Sweden) 
in April 2016. During this two-hour jam, 16 interaction and game design students with various 
international backgrounds developed a total of five different prototypes for a potential escape 
room challenge designed specifically around the skills and possibilities of ants. 
 
 
During this design activity, the participants were asked to experiment with the speculative idea of 
seeing the ants as players and design a challenge that would not be too easy, and not too difficult, 
for the ants to solve. In this case, the designers lacked any of the knowledge and perspectives that 
are customarily considered to be necessary to design a meaningful experience (in terms of 
proposing interactions that could eventually be appropriated in ways that somewhat align with 
what the designers intended). This put the designers in the situation of having to start 
experimenting and figuring things out through the practice of design with the materials that were 
available to them (and the information they could quickly obtain, such as the dimensions, weight, 
and walking pace of the ants). As an example, some of the designers started their ideation process 
by crafting metaphors taken from game design with humans and tried out where these could 
apply to designs for ants. Some groups tried, instead, to envisage and control the effects of their 
design ideas by designing puzzles and level progression while continuously trying to speculate 
and discuss how the ants would specifically interact with their prototypes. The following images 
show two of the prototypes that the designers built. 
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Figure 4: in this prototype, the designers (Ralitsa Plamenova Retkova, Simon Nilsson, Eliel Camargo-Molina, 
and Pak Lau) propose an escape room with three different stages. First the ants have to choose the correct 
wire that leads to the next area. Then the ants need to push a ball through the transparent tube. This action 
will pivot the seesaw after which the ants can exit the room through the green/red tube. 
 
Figure 5: the protoype in this image, made by Marian Vijverberg, Nele Schmidt, and Koen Wijbrands 
proposes an escape room in which the ants enter into a small room on the left of the box. The ants then have to 
crawl through the green tube to enter a bigger area. The ants can escape the room after crossing a small lake 
by building a bridge using small ropes.  
 18 
More detailed explanations of all five prototype as well as the credits of the other designers that 
took part in their ideation and assemblage can be found online through: http://wp.me/p2y7bd-dF 
 
 
Additionally, at the end of the workshop, all 16 designers filled in a survey with open questions 
regarding their experiences. Their answers illustrated how nearly all designers started considering 
the previously unexplored possibility of ants being curious and perhaps even playful. 
Furthermore, the participants reflected on ethical interrogatives and implications that should be 
discussed in the case of pursuing a design intervention that involves ants. Some of their answers: 
 
 
“They [the ants] should not be led into dangerous situations.” 
“It should not be dangerous. We should respect these small animals.” 
“Whether it is okay to design for ants without even knowing whether they want it.” 
“We should be careful of not ending up killing them or make them suffer.” 
“We created a design [in which] the ants can be trapped forever without food. We almost 
went ahead and presumed they’re smart enough to figure [this] out. I feel guilty about 
this.” 
 
However, none of the designers considered the activity as an ethically questionable exercise in 
itself, or refused to participate in it, despite the openness of the organizer regarding the mixed 
feelings she had prior to the beginning of the gamejam. In the same survey, the designers were 
asked if this short activity changed their view on ants or their relationships with them: 
 
“I have never thought that ants possibly could enjoy certain activities, instead of doing it 
out of instinct or just to survive”  
“It was super interesting as the word “empathy” often is a key word in IxD [Interaction 
Design]. This is usually easier with people as you can relate to them. It was fun trying to 
imagine yourself as an ant, and it somehow creates a “weird” bond with them that you 
had not considered before.” 
“No…Or maybe a little. We began to give them personalities.” 
“It was very interesting to design for something that you have absolutely no clue about. I 
feel more close to the ants (feels like that). And I can identify more since I know more 
about them.” 
“I think we view them as much smarter animals now.” 
“We almost humanize them by saying things are ‘fun’ and all. I don’t know how much of 
this is true, but it does make me wonder!” 
“You can design with/for ants to entertain probably mostly oneself.” 
“I never thought that ants are playful. Not that I thought they weren’t, I just did not think 
about it.” 
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Despite the subtle differences in their experiences during the workshop, we concluded that most 
designers (at least 12 out of 16 participants that completed the survey) included a specific 
reflection on their increased sensitivity and interest towards the ants that were involved in this 
project. A frequently mentioned topic included the designers’ consideration of ants being perhaps 
“more playful”, “smarter”, or “more curious” than they would expect them to be. Furthermore, 
most participants seemed to be interested in giving more thought to the idea that ants might do 
something, such as exploring or manipulating objects, for reasons that are not purely functional 
or done for immediate survival. These insights remained a topic of conversation during the next 
days of the SIDeR conference. Additionally, a follow-up survey that was send out six months 
after the gamejam elicited two replies. In both of these, the participants shared how their 
experiences changed their encounters with the ants they met after the gamejam and made them 
feel more curious and considerate towards the ants’ lives. In the next project phase, we explored 
how the ants interacted with the prototype and the response this generated. 
 
 
Phase III: playtesting and reflections, or: how Twitch closed down the livestream 
 
In this phase we wanted to complete the cycle of this exercise and invite the ants to react to the 
designs that were created by observing the ants’ interaction with the prototypes. This process was 
broadcasted on Twitch and other online streaming platforms with the aim of generating 
conversations and furthering reflections concerning the ideas that this project proposes. After the 
first day of streaming, the platform Twitch closed the online broadcast of the ants interacting with 
the escape room prototypes and labelled it as “non-gaming related content”. This event generated 
mixed feelings among viewers that started arguing online about the potential paradox (and the 
irony) of designing escape rooms for captive animals and society’s concept of gaming understood 
as an exclusively human activity. This situation produced several online discussions and 
illustrated different degrees of sensitivity that people perceived in their relationships with these 
ants while watching them interact with the prototypes. Some examples: 
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Figure 6: some of the online reactions on the livestream of the ants interacting with the five different 
prototypes. The degree to which people shared different forms of empathy towards the ants varied greatly. 
Some people were very engaged with the interactions of the ants with each of the prototypes, whereas others 
discussed the cruelty that this project inflicts.   
 
Over a period of five weeks, the ants interacted with each of the five prototypes. During this time, 
the ants managed to escape from three of the five rooms. More details on these escapes and their 
interactions with each specific room can be found online via http://wp.me/p2y7bd-eT  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this paper we followed Haraway’s notion of ‘situated knowledges’, an understanding of design 
as a practice of ‘configuring and prefiguring situations’, and Kohn’s wider perspectives on selves 
as entities that are alive and respond. These theories inspired us to argue for the value of paying 
attention to the local knowledges that can specifically arise from design practices. The insights 
and transformations that (game) design-driven approaches produce could help us approach and 
engage with ‘the other’ as a form of ‘doing’ multispecies philosophy. With this framework we 
aim to expand our moral concern towards other animals and to critically rethink relationships 
with other entities on our planet. Specifically related to (game) design, we propose the inclusion 
of other selves that could actively participate in design processes and respond to the artefacts we 
create.  
 
 
In taking this framework into the practice of design, we discussed how the ongoing design project 
for (and with) ants generated new perspectives and sensitivities concerning our engagement with 
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other beings. The reflections and conversations that emerged during (and because) the design 
experiment with ants (Part 3) constitute fragmented, subjective, and incomplete interpretations of 
insights that were gained during and after this short exercise. As ‘situated knowledges’, they do 
not simply share facts about the lives and behaviours of ants; they also illustrate how the act of 
getting contextually engaged with the life of other species can be a transformative exercise that 
generates sensitivities and empathy towards other selves. This process was naturally already 
influenced by the preconceptions and ideologies of the designer that organised and guided the 
different events that took place. However, it is important to note that the ants were not passive 
entities during this process: by being there, acting, escaping, responding, and appropriating 
artefacts in unexpected ways, they influenced the way in which these transformations took place 
and the project evolved during all three phases.     
 
 
Without taking any deliberate sides as to the debate whether the ants are players or not, our 
exploratory design exercise with ants spurred multiple conversations (both online and in person) 
concerning play and player subjectivity. What we considered to be one of the most interesting 
approaches on this particular corollary of our engagement with ants was to try to understand the 
prototypes in terms of what Björk and Juul identified as ‘Zero-Player Games’ (Björk & Juul 
2012)9. We feel that this label does not do particular justice to the role of the ants, reduced to 
trivial, automated agents, but we believe that this concept of Björk and Juul is a relevant and 
stimulating framework to continue the conversation on other selves and their playfulness. It 
offers an initial springboard for the further exploration of the concept of ants (or other selves) as 
participating to the design and to the functioning of a game without labelling them as players in 
the conventional use of the term, or imbuing them with playful attitudes and needs that might be 
difficult to detect or discuss. 
 
 
In articulating and practically trying out new perspectives that combine notions of knowledge, 
design, and selves, we suggest that our efforts in this project merely entail a first experiment in 
exploring the transformational qualities of design towards embracing and responding to 
‘otherness’. Not only our perceptions of other selves and how they can be involved in the practice 
of design might shift, but also the very definition of what constitutes a self could undergo more 
expansion and refinement through both theoretical and practical engagements. 
 
                                                      
9 Here, under the label of Zero Player Games, we discuss games (or more generally artefacts) devoid of player 
involvement. In particular, escape rooms for ants could be described as fitting under two of the categories of ‘zero-
player games’ envisaged by the authors:  
 ‘setup-only games’ (games for which player input is only possible in the initial setup, after which the game 
proceeds on its own), and 
 ‘games played by AIs [artificial intelligence]’ (Björk & Juul 2012). 
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We argue that – similar to the activity of play (Westerlaken & Gualeni, 2013) – the practice of 
design, as a form of ‘doing’ multispecies philosophy, allows for unexpected situations capable of 
stimulating new thoughts, alternative points of views, and previously unexperienced forms of 
engagement. This seems to be a fruitful context where responses can be exchanged and 
transformations happen.  
 
 
As part of our shared research interests, as authors we consider it fruitful and important to 
continue investigating design (and game design in particular, but not exclusively) in its potential 
to elicit and accompany self-transformation as well as a less constrained capability to imagine 
and operate in the world. In this specific instance, we focused on the possibility for (game) design 
to help give rise to a less speciesist world, but these efforts could focus on other societal issues as 
well10. If nothing else, this first attempt to negotiate with otherness will affect our next encounter 
with ants. 
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